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Introduction
Instances abound where economic agents have to decide whether to use their current information optimally, or whether to forgo current payoffs in order to gather information which might potentially be parlayed into higher payoffs come tomorrow. Often, though, economic agents do not make these decisions in isolation; rather, the production of information is a public good. Think, for instance, of firms exploring neighboring oil fields, or a research team investigating a certain hypothesis, where it is not possible to assign credit to the individual researcher actually responsible for the decisive breakthrough. The canonical framework to analyze these questions involving purely informational externalities is provided by the literature on strategic experimentation with bandits. 1
As information is a public good, one's first intuition may be that, on account of freeriding, there will always be inefficiently little experimentation in equilibrium. Indeed, the previous literature on strategic experimentation with bandits shows that, with positively correlated two-armed bandits, 2 there never exists an efficient equilibrium; with negatively correlated bandits, 3 there exists an efficient equilibrium if, and only if, stakes are below a certain threshold. In his canonical Moral Hazard in Teams paper, Holmström (1982) shows that a team cannot produce efficiently in the absence of a budget-breaking principal, on account of payoff externalities between team members. Surprisingly, though, my analysis shows that, in a model with purely informational externalities in which players can choose whether to investigate a given hypothesis or its negation, the efficient solution becomes incentive compatible if the stakes at play exceed a certain threshold. The extension of players' action sets to include how they go about investigating a given hypothesis thus matters greatly for the results.
Specifically, I consider two players operating replica three-armed exponential bandits in continuous time. 4 One arm is safe in that it yields a known flow payoff, whereas the other two arms are risky, i.e. they can be either good or bad. As the risky arms are meant to symbolize two mutually incompatible hypotheses, I assume that it is common knowledge that exactly one of the risky arms is good. The bad risky arm never yields a positive payoff, whereas a good risky arm yields positive payoffs after exponentially distributed times. As the expected payoff of a good risky arm exceeds that of the safe arm, players will want to know which risky arm is good. As either player's actions, as well as the outcomes of his experimentation, are perfectly publicly observable, there is an incentive for players to free-ride on the information the other player is providing; information is a public good. Moreover, observability, together with a common prior, implies that the players' beliefs agree at all times. As only a good risky arm can ever yield a positive payoff, all the uncertainty is resolved as soon as either player has a breakthrough on a risky arm of his and beliefs become degenerate at the true state of the world. In the absence of such a breakthrough, players incrementally become more pessimistic about that risky arm that is more heavily utilized. As all the payoffrelevant strategic interaction is captured by the players' common belief process, I restrict players to using stationary Markov strategies with their common posterior belief as the state variable, thus making my results directly comparable to those in the previous strategic experimentation literature.
In the game with positively correlated two-armed bandits, Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) find two dimensions of inefficiency in any equilibrium: The overall amount of the resource devoted over time to the risky arm conditional on there not having been a breakthrough, the so-called experimentation amount, is too low, as is the intensity of experimentation, i.e. the resources devoted to the risky arm at a given instant t. Analyzing negatively correlated two-armed bandits, Klein & Rady (2010) find that, while the experimentation intensity may be inefficient, the experimentation amount is at efficient levels. 5 In particular, learning will be complete, i.e. beliefs will almost surely eventually become degenerate at the true state of the world in any equilibrium, if, and only if, efficiency so requires. Here, I show that learning will be complete in any equilibrium with continuous value functions for exactly the same parameter range as is the case in Klein & Rady (2010) . In the present model, however, complete learning is efficient for a wider set of parameters, as both players can reap the benefits of a breakthrough, while in Klein & Rady (2010) one player will be stuck with the losing project.
There are two distinct effects at play that make players in the three-armed setup perform better than in the two-armed model. The first effect is also apparent in the comparison of the planner's solutions, and is based on a strictly positive option value to both players' having access to the initially less auspicious approach. The second effect is less obvious, and purely strategic: Indeed, while even the lower appertaining planner's solution is not compatible with equilibrium in the two-armed model, 6 the higher planner's solution can be 5 If the correlation is −1, this is true for all Markov Perfect equilibria. If correlation is imperfect, there always exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium with this property.
6 As already mentioned, the negatively correlated case with low stakes provides a notable exception, cf. Klein & Rady (2010) .
achieved in equilibrium with three arms, if the stakes are high enough. The reason for this is that with the stakes high enough, the safe option of doing essentially nothing becomes so unattractive that it can be completely disregarded. But then, since there are no payoff rivalries or switching costs in my model, given an opponent behaves in the same fashion, a player is willing to go for the project that looks momentarily more promising, which is exactly what efficiency requires. In Klein & Rady (2010) , by contrast, players will always choose the safe option if their assigned task looks sufficiently hopeless.
Having characterized the single-agent and the utilitarian planner's solutions, which are both symmetric, I construct a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium with the players' common posterior belief as the state variable for all parameter values. For those parameters where learning is incomplete in equilibrium, I find that the experimentation amount, as well as the intensity, are inefficiently low. This obtains because, as in Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) , there is no encouragement effect in these equilibria, 7 and hence experimentation will stop at the single-agent cutoff rather than the more pessimistic efficient cutoff, which takes into account that both players benefit from finding out which project is good. Indeed, as is characteristic of the team production paradigm, individual players do not take into account that their efforts are also benefiting their partner.
The planner's and the single agent's solutions, as well as the equilibria I construct, all exhibit continuous value functions. I show in section 4 that learning will be complete in any equilibrium with continuous value functions, provided the stakes at play exceed a certain threshold.
The present paper is related to a fast-growing strand of literature on bandits. Whereas the introduction of strategic interaction into the model is due to Bolton & Harris (1999) , the use of bandit models in economics harks back to the discrete-time model of Rothschild (1974) . 8 While the first papers analyzing strategic interaction featured a Brownian motion model (Bolton & Harris, 1999 , the exponential framework I use has proved itself to be more tractable (cf. Keller, Rady, Cripps, 2005 , Keller & Rady, 2010 , Klein & Rady, 2010 . These previous papers analyzed variants of the two-armed positively correlated model, with the exception of Klein & Rady (2010) , who introduced negative correlation into the literature. 7 The encouragement effect was first identified in the Brownian motion model of Bolton & Harris (1999) .
It makes players experiment at beliefs that are more pessimistic than their single-agent cutoff, because they will have a success with a non-zero probability, which will make the other players more optimistic also, thus inducing them to provide more experimentation, from which the first player can then benefit. With fully revealing breakthroughs as in this model, as well as in Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) and Klein & Rady (2010) , however, a player could not care less what others might do after a breakthrough, as there will not be anything left to learn. Therefore, there is no encouragement effect in these models. 8 Bandit models have been analyzed as early as the 1950s; see e.g. Bradt, Johnson, Karlin (1956) .
While the afore-mentioned papers, as well as the present one, assume both actions and outcomes to be public information, there has been one recent contribution by Bonatti & Hörner (2010) analyzing strategic interaction under the assumption that only outcomes are publicly observable, while actions are private information. 9 Rosenberg, Solan, Vieille (2007) , as well as Murto & Välimäki (2006) , analyze the two-armed problem of public actions and private outcomes in discrete time, assuming action choices are irreversible. 10 & Välimäki (1996 & Välimäki ( , 2000 analyze strategic experimentation in buyer-seller setups. In their 1996 model, they investigate the case of a single buyer facing multiple firms offering a product of differing, and initially unknown, quality, and show that experimentation is efficient in any Markov perfect equilibrium in this setting. With multiple buyers and two firms, one of which offers a product of known quality, whereas the other firm's product quality is initially unknown, equilibrium results in excessive experimentation. 11 The reason for this is that price competition leads the "risky" firm to subsidize experimentation beyond efficient levels. If there are many different markets, though, with each having its own, separate, incumbent firm, while the same "risky" firm is active in all the markets, incumbents price more aggressively as they also benefit from the experimentation being performed in other markets. Indeed, Bergemann & Välimäki (2000) show that as the number of markets grows large, experimentation tends toward efficient levels. Manso (2010) analyzes the case of a single worker, who can either shirk, or take risks and innovate, or produce in an established, safe, manner. In a two-period model, he shows that, in order to induce risk taking, the principal will optimally be very tolerant of, or even reward, early failure and long-term success. In a related fully dynamic continuous-time model, Klein (2010) also shows that incentives are optimally provided through continuation values after breakthroughs. He furthermore shows that the principal will optimally choose to implement the efficient amount of experimentation. Chatterjee & Evans (2004) analyze an R & D race also involving payoff externalities in discrete time, where it is common knowledge that exactly one of several projects is good. As in my model, they allow players to switch projects at any point in time.
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two-armed bandit operated by a single decision maker.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; section 3 analyzes the benchmarks provided by the single agent's and the utilitarian planner's problems; section 4 analyzes some long-run properties of equilibrium learning; section 5 analyzes the non-cooperative game, exposing a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for all parameter values, and a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium; section 6 concludes. Proofs are provided in the appendix.
The Model
I consider a model of two players, either of whom operates a replica three-armed bandit in continuous time. Bandits are of the exponential type as studied e.g. in Keller, Rady & Cripps (2005) . One arm is safe in that it yields a known flow payoff of s; both other arms, A and B, are risky, and it is commonly known that exactly one of these risky arms is good and one is bad. The bad risky arm never yields any payoff; the good risky arm yields a positive payoff with a probability of λ dt if played over a time interval of length dt; the appertaining expected payoff increment amounts to g dt. The constants λ and g are assumed to be common knowledge between the players. In order for the problem to be interesting, we assume that a good risky arm is better than a safe arm, which is better than a bad risky arm, i.e. g > s > 0.
The objective of both players is to maximize their expected discounted payoffs by choosing the fraction of their flow resource they want to allocate to either risky arm. Specifically, either player i chooses a stochastic process {(k i,A , k i,B )(t)} 0≤t which is measurable with respect to the information filtration that is generated by the observations available up to time t, with (k i,A , k i,B )(t) ∈ {(a, b) ∈ [0, 1] 2 : a + b ≤ 1} for all t; k i,A (t) and k i,B (t)) denote the fraction of the resource devoted by player i at time t to risky arms A and B, respectively. Throughout the game, either player's actions and payoffs are perfectly observable to the other player. At the outset of the game, the players share a common prior belief that risky arm A is the good one, which I denote by p 0 . Thus, players share a common posterior p t at all times t. Thus, specifically, player i seeks to maximize his total expected discounted payoff
where the expectation is taken with respect to the processes {p t } t∈R + and {(k i,A , k i,B )(t)} t∈R + .
As can immediately be seen from this objective function, there are no payoff externalities between the players; the only channel through which the presence of the other player may impact a given player is via his belief p t , i.e. via the information that the other player is generating. Thus, ours is a game of purely informational externalities.
As only a good risky arm can ever yield a lump sum, breakthroughs are fully revealing. Thus, if there is a lump sum on risky arm A (B) at time τ , then p t = 1 (p t = 0) at all t > τ . If there has not been a breakthrough by time τ , Bayes' Rule yields
where K A,t := k 1,A (t) + k 2,A (t) and K B,t := k 1,B (t) + k 2,B (t). Thus, conditional on no breakthrough having occurred, the process {p t } t∈R + will evolve according to the law of motioṅ
As all payoff-relevant strategic interaction is captured by the players' common posterior beliefs {p t } t∈R + , it seems quite natural to focus on Markov perfect equilibria with the players' common posterior belief p t as the state variable. As is well known, this restriction is without loss of generality in the single agent's and the planner's problems, which are studied in Section 3. In the non-cooperative game, the restriction rules out history-dependent play that is familiar from discrete-time models. 12 A Markov strategy for player i is any piecewise
exhibits a finite number of jumps. However, this definition does not guarantee the existence, and even less the uniqueness, of a solution to Bayes' Rule, which now amounts to
. Further restrictions on the players' strategy spaces are hence needed to ensure that their actions and payoffs be well-defined and uniquely pinned down. I shall call admissible all strategy pairs for which Bayes' rule admits of a solution that coincides with the limit of the unique discrete-time solution. This in effect boils down to ruling out those strategy pairs for which there either is no solution in continuous time, or for which the solution is different from the discrete-time limit.
All that matters for the admissibility of a given strategy pair is the behavior of the function ∆(p) := sgn{K B (p)−K A (p)} at those beliefs p ‡ where a change in sign occurs, i.e. where it is not the case that lim p↑p ‡ ∆(p) = ∆(p ‡ ) = lim p↓p ‡ ∆(p). Given my definition of strategies, there are only finitely many such beliefs p ‡ , and hence both one-sided limits will exist. By proceeding as in Klein & Rady (2010) , one can show that admissibility has to be defined for pairs of strategies, i.e. it is impossible to define a player's set of admissible strategies without reference to his opponent's action. Now, a pair of strategies is admissible if, and only if, it either exhibits no change in sign, or only changes in sign (lim p↑p ‡ ∆(p), ∆(p ‡ ), lim p↓p ‡ ∆(p)) of the following types: (1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1), (−1, 0, 1), (−1, 0, 0), (−1, 0, −1), (−1, 1, 1), (−1, −1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 0, −1), (−1, −1, 0), (1, 0, −1).
Each strategy pair (k 1 , k 2 ) = ((k 1,A , k 1,B ), (k 2,A , k 2,B )) induces a pair of payoff functions (u 1 , u 2 ) with u i given by
is an indicator function that is 1 whenever the strategy pair is admissible. Thus, non-admissible strategy pairs lead to payoffs of u 1 = u 2 = 0.
In the subsequent analysis, it will prove useful to make case distinctions based on the stakes at play, as measured by the ratio of the expected payoff of a good risky arm over that of a safe arm ( g s ), the players' impatience (as measured by the discount rate r), and the Poisson arrival rate of a good risky arm λ, which can be interpreted as the players' innate ability at finding out the truth: I say that the stakes are high if g s ≥ 
where c A (p) := s − pg and c B (p) := s − (1 − p)g measure the myopic opportunity costs of playing risky arm A (risky arm B) rather than the safe arm
, by contrast, measure the value of information gleaned from playing risky arm A (or risky arm B, respectively). 14 Playing risky arm A, e.g., would yield an expected instantaneous payoff of pg rather than s. Thus, a myopic agent, i.e. one who was only interested in maximizing his current payoff, would prefer risky arm A over the safe arm if, and only if, p > p m , where p m = s g is defined by c A (p m ) = 0. By the same token, he would prefer risky arm B over the safe arm, if, and only if, p < 1 − p m . A far-sighted agent, however, derives a learning benefit over and above the myopic benefit from using either risky arm. Indeed, as the uncertainty is about the distribution underlying the risky arms, the only way for the agent to learn is to play a risky arm. Conceptually, while 1 r measures the discounting, pλ[g − u(p)] measures the expected value of a potential jump, as λ is the Poisson arrival rate of a breakthrough on risky arm A given that the arm is good while p is the probability that it is good; g is the value the agent jumps to in case of a success, while u(p) is the value he jumps from. The second component, −λp(1 − p)u ′ (p) = u ′ (p) dp, captures the incremental change in value as a result of the infinitesimal movement in beliefs that is brought about by the agent's playing risky if there is no breakthrough.
As the Bellman equation is linear in the agent's choice variables, it is without loss of generality for me to restrict my attention to corner solutions, for which it is straightforward to derive closed-form solutions for the value function:
If the agent sets (k A , k B )(p) = (0, 0), then u(p) = s.
If he sets (k A , k B )(p) = (1, 0), then his value function satisfies the following ODE:
where C is some constant of integration, and Ω(p) := 1−p p is the odds ratio.
13 By standard arguments, if a continuously differentiable function solves the Bellman equation, it is the value function; see also Klein & Rady (2010) . 14 By the standard principle of smooth pasting, the agent's payoff function from playing an optimal policy is once continuously differentiable.
If he sets (k A , k B )(p) = (0, 1), then his value function satisfies the following ODE:
, and the agent's value amounts to u(p) = r+λ 2r+λ g =: u 11 .
The optimal policy for the single agent depends on whether the stakes at play, as measured by the ratio g s , exceed the threshold of 2r+λ r+λ or not. Note that g s ≤ 2r+λ r+λ if and only if p * 1 ≥ 1 2 , where p * 1 ≡ rs (r+λ)g−λs denotes the optimal single-agent cutoff in the standard two-armed problem with one safe and one risky arm A, and 1 − p * 1 is the corresponding threshold for the two-armed problem with one safe arm and one risky arm B. 15 
This solution continues to be optimal if g s = 2r+λ r+λ .
The result is illustrated in figure 1. The agent thus optimally behaves as though he was operating a two-armed bandit with one safe arm and one risky arm of that type that is initially more likely to be good. With low enough stakes, therefore, the option value of having an additional risky arm is 0.
As is easily verified, the optimal solution implies incomplete learning. Indeed, let us suppose that it is risky arm A that is good. Then, if the initial prior
, then p t = p 0 for all t, since the agent will always play safe. If p 0 ∈]p * 1 , 1], it is straightforward to show that the belief will converge to p * 1 with probability Ω(p 0 )
Proposition 3.2 (Single-Agent Solution for Intermediate and High Stakes) If g s > 2r+λ r+λ , the agent will play his risky arm B at all beliefs p < 1 2 and his risky arm A at all beliefs p > 1 2 . At p = 1 2 , he will split his resources equally between his risky arms. His value function is given by
The result is illustrated in figure 2.
Thus, there now is an option value to having access to the alternative risky project, as for any p ∈ [0, 1], there is now a positive probability of the agent's ending up at p = 1 2 , and thus using the project that initially looked less promising. The single agent's behavior at p = 1 2 is dictated by the need to ensure a well-defined time path for the belief. 16 Note that whenever stakes exceed the threshold of 2r+λ r+λ , the single agent will make sure learning is complete, i.e. the truth will be found out with probability 1.
The Planner's Problem
I now turn to the investigation of a benevolent utilitarian planner's solution to the twoplayer problem at hand. As the planner does not care about the distribution of surplus, 16 cf. also Presman (1990) . and both players are equally apt at finding out the truth, all that matters to him is the sum of resources devoted to both risky arms of type A (B), which I denote by K A (K B ). Straightforward computations show that the planner's Bellman equation is given by
Again, the planner's problem is linear in the choice variables, and we can therefore without loss of generality restrict our attention to corner solutions.
If K A = K B = 0 is optimal, u(p) = s.
If K A = 2 and K B = 0 is optimal, the Bellman equation is tantamount to the following ODE:
where C is again some constant of integration.
If K A = 0 and K B = 2 is optimal, the Bellman equation amounts to the following ODE:
If (2, 0) and (0, 2), and therefore also (1, 1), are optimal, the planner's value satisfies u(p) = r + 2λ 2(r + λ) g =: u 11 .
Which policy is optimal will again depend on the stakes at play, though this time the relevant threshold is different from the single agent's problem, namely 2(r+λ) r+2λ . Note that 
This solution continues to be optimal if g s = 2(r+λ) r+2λ .
The planner's solution thus has pretty much the same structure as the single agent's solution for low stakes; as the latter, it implies incomplete learning. However, it is a different cutoff, namely p * 2 , that is relevant now. p * 2 is always strictly less than p * 1 , and is familiar from the two-player two-armed bandit problem with perfect positive correlation, 17 where the utilitarian planner will apply the cutoff p * 2 . As in the low-stakes single-agent problem, the value of the risky project that is less likely to be good is so low that it does not play a role in the optimization problem. The planner is more reluctant, though, completely to forsake the less auspicious project, simply because, in case of a success, he gets twice the goodies, so information is more valuable to him than it is to the single agent. This effect is absent in the negatively correlated two-armed bandit case, which is why in Klein & Rady (2010) the relevant cutoff continues to be p * 1 for the planner.
Proposition 3.4 (Planner's Solution for Stakes that Are Not Very Low) If g s > 2(r+λ) r+2λ , the planner will play the same arm on both bandits at almost all beliefs. Specifically, he will play arm A on ] 1 2 , 1] and arm B on [0, 1 2 [. At p = 1 2 , he will split his resources equally between the risky arms. The corresponding payoff function is given by
17 cf. Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) This solution continues to be optimal if g s = 2(r+λ) r+2λ .
At the knife-edge case of g s = 2(r+λ) r+2λ , the planner is indifferent over all three arms at p = 1 2 . Yet, in order to ensure a well-defined time path of beliefs, he has to set K
Note that if the stakes at play are not very low, the planner's solution implies complete learning, i.e. he will make sure the truth will eventually be found out with probability 1. As a matter of fact, the solution is quite intuitive: As the planner does not care which of the risky arms is good, the solution is symmetric around p = 1 2 . Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that as g s ≥ 2(r+λ) r+2λ , playing risky always dominates the safe arm as u 11 ≥ s. However, on account of the linear structure in the Bellman equation, it is always the case that either (2, 0) or (0, 2) dominates (1, 1). Therefore, the only candidate for a solution has the planner switch at p = 1 2 . At the switch point p = 1 2 itself, the planner's actions are pinned down by the need to ensure a well-defined law of motion of the state variable.
Long-Run Equilibrium Learning
Previous literature has noted that with perfectly positively correlated two-armed bandits, learning is always incomplete, i.e. there is a positive probability that the truth will never be found out. As a matter of fact, Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) find that, on account of freeriding incentives, the overall amount of experimentation performed over time is inefficiently low in any equilibrium. On the other hand, Klein & Rady (2010) find that with perfectly negatively correlated bandits, the amount of experimentation is at efficient levels in any equilibrium; in particular, learning will be complete in any equilibrium if and only if efficiency so requires.
The purpose of this section is to derive conditions under which, in our framework, learning will be complete in any equilibrium in which players' value functions are continuous. To this end, I define as u * 1 the value function of a single agent operating a bandit with only a safe arm and a risky arm A, while I denote by u * 2 the value function of a single agent operating a bandit with only a safe arm and a risky arm B. It is straightforward to verify that u * 2 (p) = u * 1 (1 − p) for all p and that 18
18 cf. Prop.3.1 in Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) 13
The following lemma tells us that u * 1 and u * 2 are both lower bounds on players' value functions in any equilibrium with continuous value functions. The intuition for this result is very straightforward. Indeed, there are only informational externalities, no payoff externalities, in our model. Thus, intuitively, a player can only benefit from any information his opponent provides him for free; therefore, he should be expected to do at least as well as if he were by himself, forgoing the use of one of his risky arms to boot. Now, if g s > 2r+λ r+λ , then p * 1 < 1 2 < 1 − p * 1 , so at any belief p, we have that u * 1 (p) > s or u * 2 (p) > s or both. Thus, there cannot exist a p such that (k 1,A , k 1,B )(p) = (k 2,A , k 2,B )(p) = (0, 0) be mutually best responses as this would mean u 1 (p) = u 2 (p) = s. This proves the following proposition:
r+λ , learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium with continuous value functions.
It is the same threshold 2r+λ r+λ above which complete learning is efficient, and prevails in any equilibrium, in the perfectly negatively correlated two-armed bandit case. 19 In our setting, however, complete learning is efficient for a larger set of parameters, as we saw in Proposition 3.4.
Moreover, the planner's solution is an obvious upper bound on players' average equilibrium payoffs. If g s < 2(r+λ) r+2λ , we know from Proposition 3.4 that the planner's value is s on the non-degenerate interval [1 − p * 2 , p * 2 ]. Since there cannot be an open interval on which a player's value is less than s, it will be s almost everywhere on [1 − p * 2 , p * 2 ]. Since either player can always guarantee himself a payoff of s by playing safe forever, so that s is an obvious lower bound on either player's equilibrium payoffs, this means both players' value must be s on [1 − p * 2 , p * 2 ] in any equilibrium. Therefore, in any equilibrium, both players uniquely play safe almost everywhere in [1 − p * 2 , p * 2 ], implying the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3 (Incomplete Learning) If g s < 2(r+λ) r+2λ , learning will be incomplete in any equilibrium.
Strategic Problem
Proceeding as before, I find that the Bellman equation for player i (i = j) is given by 20
As players are perfectly symmetric in that they are operating two replicas of the same bandit, the Bellman equation for player j looks exactly the same. It is noteworthy that a player only has to bear the opportunity costs of his own experimentation, while the benefits accrue to both, which indicates the presence of free-riding incentives.
On account of the linear structure of the optimization problem, we can restrict our attention to the nine pure strategy profiles, along with three indifference cases per player. Each of these cases leads to a first-order ordinary differential equation (ODE). Details, as well as closed-form solutions, are provided in Appendix A.
Necessary Conditions for Best Responses
The linearity of the problem provides us with a powerful tool to derive necessary conditions for a certain strategy combination ((k 1,A , k 1,B ), (k 2,A , k 2,B )) to be consistent with mutually best responses on an open set of beliefs. 21 As an example, suppose player 2 is playing (1, 0). If player 1's best response is given by (1, 0), it follows immediately from the Bellman equation that it must be the case that definitions of B A and B B , is to be understood as the one-sided derivative in the direction implied by the motion of beliefs. In either instance, standard results imply that if for a certain fixed (k j,A , k j,B ), the payoff function generated by the policy (k i,A , k i,B ) solves the Bellman equation, then (k i,A , k i,B ) is a best response to (k j,A , k j,B ). which can be plugged into the two inequalities above, yielding a necessary condition for (k 1,A , k 1,B ) = (1, 0) to be a best response to (k 2,A , k 2,B ) = (1, 0). Proceeding in this manner for the possible pure-strategy combinations gives us necessary conditions for a certain purestrategy combination to be consistent with mutually best responses on an open interval of beliefs, which I report as an auxiliary result in Appendix A.
Efficiency
Inefficiency because of free-riding has hitherto been a staple result of the literature on strategic experimentation (cf. Bolton & Harris, 1999 , Keller, Rady, Cripps, 2005 , Keller & Rady, 2010 . Introducing negative correlation into the strategic experimentation literature, Klein & Rady (2010) find that efficient behavior is incentive-compatible if and only if the stakes are low enough. The essential reason for this is as follows: With the stakes low enough, it is clear that the more pessimistic player will never play risky; therefore, the more optimistic player, not having an opportunity to free-ride on his opponent's efforts, will behave efficiently. As a matter of fact, Klein & Rady's (2010) efficient equilibrium disappears as soon as the players' single-agent cutoffs overlap, and free-riding incentives come into play again.
Here, though, the opposite result prevails: The efficient solution is incentive-compatible if, and only if, the stakes are high enough, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5.1 (Efficient Equilibrium) There exists an efficient equilibrium if and only if g s ≥ 4(r+λ) 2r+3λ .
Indeed, the mechanism ensuring existence of an efficient equilibrium for low stakes in Klein & Rady (2010) cannot be at work here, since both players are operating replica bandits. Therefore, if one player has an incentive to experiment given the other player abstains from experimentation, then so does the other player, and free-riding motives enter the picture, no matter how low the stakes might be. One possible intuition for why we here obtain efficiency for high stakes is as follows: For high enough stakes, players would never consider the safe option. Moreover, the efficient policy coincides with the single-agent policy, namely, either implies both players' playing risky, at full throttle, on the arm that is more likely to be good. Therefore, for a player to deviate from this policy in equilibrium, he has to be given special incentives to do so; in the absence of such incentives, e.g. when the other player sticks to the efficient policy, a player's best response calls for his doing the efficient thing also, i.e. there exists an efficient equilibrium. However, for free-riding incentives to be totally eclipsed, stakes have to exceed a threshold that is higher than the one making sure a single agent would never play safe. Indeed, as we have seen, stakes higher than this latter threshold only ensure that learning will be complete in any equilibrium, i.e. while the experimentation amount is at efficient levels, the intensity does not reach efficient levels as long as g s < 4(r+λ) 2r+3λ .
While it is not surprising that the utilitarian planner, who now has more options, should always be doing better than the planner in Klein & Rady (2010) , who could not transfer resources between the two types of risky arm, it may seem somewhat surprising that the players should now be able to achieve even this higher efficient benchmark, while they could not achieve the lower benchmark in the perfectly negatively correlated two-armed model in Klein & Rady (2010) . Indeed, with the stakes high enough, free-riding incentives can be overcome completely in non-cooperative equilibrium.
Symmetric Equilibrium for Low And Intermediate Stakes
The purpose of this section is to construct a symmetric equilibrium for those parameter values for which there does not exist an efficient equilibrium. I define symmetry in keeping with Bolton & Harris (1999) as well as Keller, Rady, Cripps (2005) :
Definition An equilibrium is said to be symmetric if equilibrium strategies ((k 1,A , k 1,B 
As a matter of course, in any symmetric equilibrium, u 1 (p) = u 2 (p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. I shall denote the players' common value function by u.
Low Stakes
Recall that the stakes are low if, and only if, the single-agent cutoffs for the two risky arms do not overlap. It can be shown that in this case the symmetric equilibrium in Keller, Rady, and Cripps (Prop. 5.1, 2005) will survive in the sense that there exists an equilibrium that is essentially two copies of the Keller, Rady, and Cripps equilibrium, mirrored at the p = 1 2 axis. Specifically, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5.2 (Symmetric MPE for Low Stakes) If g s ≤ 2r+λ r+λ , there exists a symmetric equilibrium where both players exclusively use the safe arm on [1 − p * 1 , p * 1 ], the risky arm A above the beliefp > p * 1 , and the risky arm B at beliefs below 1 −p, wherep is defined implicitly by
.
In [p * 1 ,p], the fraction k A (p) = u(p)−s c A (p) is allocated to risky arm A, while 1 − k A (p) is allocated to the safe arm; in [1 −p, 1 − p * 1 ], the fraction k B (p) = u(p)−s c B (p) is allocated to risky arm B, while 1 − k B (p) is allocated to the safe arm.
. Then, the players' value function is given by u
where the constants of integration C h and C l are determined by V h (p) = W (p) and V l (1 −p) = W (1 −p), respectively.
Thus, in this equilibrium, even though either player knows that one of his risky arms is good, whenever the uncertainty is greatest, the safe option is attractive to the point that he cannot be bothered to find out which one it is. When players are relatively certain which risky arm is good, they invest all their resources in that arm. When the uncertainty is of medium intensity, the equilibrium has the flavor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, with players devoting a uniquely determined fraction of their resources to the risky arm they deem more likely to be good, with the rest being invested in the safe option. As a matter of fact, the experimentation intensity decreases continuously from k A (p) = 1 to k A (p * 1 ) = 0 (from k B (1−p) = 1 to k B (1−p * 1 ) = 0). Even though players' Bellman equations are linear in the strategy variable, the equilibrium requires them to use interior levels of experimentation. Intuitively, the situation is very much reminiscent of the classical Battle of the Sexes game: If one's partner experiments, one would like to free-ride on his efforts; if one's partner plays safe, though, one would rather do the experimentation himself than give up on finding out the truth. Now, in symmetric equilibrium, the experimentation intensities are chosen in exactly such a manner as to render the other player indifferent between experimenting and playing safe, thus making him willing to mix over both his options.
Having seen that there exists an equilibrium implying incomplete learning, and exhibiting continuous value functions, for g s ≤ 2r+λ r+λ , we are now in a position to strengthen our result on complete learning: For perfect negative correlation, Klein & Rady (2010) found that with the possible exception of the knife-edge case where g s = 2r+λ r+λ , learning was going to be complete in any equilibrium if and only if complete learning was efficient. While complete learning obtains in any equilibrium with continuous value functions for the exact same parameter set in both models, here, by contrast, we find that if 2(r+λ) r+2λ < g s ≤ 2r+λ r+λ , efficiency uniquely calls for complete learning, yet there exists an equilibrium entailing incomplete learning. This is because with three-armed bandits information is more valuable to the planner, as in case of a success he gets the full payoff of a good risky arm. With negatively correlated two-armed bandits, however, the planner cannot shift resources between the two types of risky arm; thus, his payoff in case of a success is just g+s 2 .
Intermediate Stakes
For intermediate stakes, the equilibrium I construct is essentially of the same structure as the previous one: It is symmetric and it requires players to mix on some interval of beliefs. However, there does not exist an interval where both players play safe, so that players will always eventually find out the true state of the world, even though they do so inefficiently slowly. In equilibrium, both players will exclusively use their risky arm A in [p † , 1], and their risky arm B in [0, 1 − p † ]. In ] 1 2 , p † ], the fraction k A (p) = W(p)−s c A (p) is allocated to risky arm A, while 1 − k A (p) is allocated to the safe arm; in [p † , 1 2 [, the fraction k B (p) = W(p)−s c B (p) is allocated to risky arm B, while 1 − k B (p) is allocated to the safe arm. At p = 1 2 , a fraction of
is allocated to either risky arm, with the rest being allocated to the safe arm.
2λ . Then, the players' value function is given by u
Thus, no matter what initial prior players start out from, there is a positive probability beliefs will end up at p = 1 2 , and hence they will try the risky project that looked initially less auspicious. Therefore, in contrast to the equilibrium for low stakes, there is a positive value attached to the option of having access to the second risky project.
Conclusion
I have analyzed a game of strategic experimentation with three-armed bandits, where the two risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated. In so doing, I have constructed a symmetric equilibrium for all parameter values. Furthermore, we have seen that any equilibrium is inefficient if stakes are below a certain threshold, and that any equilibrium with continuous value functions involves complete learning if stakes are above a certain threshold. In particular, if the stakes are high, there exists an efficient equilibrium and learning will be complete in any equilibrium with continuous value functions. If stakes are intermediate in size, all equilibria are inefficient, though they involve complete learning (provided there are no discontinuities in the value functions), as required by efficiency. If the stakes are low but not very low, all equilibria are inefficient; there exists an equilibrium that involves incomplete learning, while efficiency requires complete learning. If the stakes are very low, the efficient solution implies incomplete learning; all equilibria involve incomplete learning and are inefficient.
While I have only investigated the case of perfect negative correlation, the impact of general pessimismà la Klein & Rady (2010) on the existence of an efficient equilibrium might constitute an interesting object of further investigation. It seems clear that, in this problem, the planner's solution would feature (0, 0) on [0, p * 2 ] 2 , (2, 0) for p A > max{p B , p * 2 }, (0, 2) for p B > max{p A , p * 2 }, and (1, 1) for p A = p B > p * 2 . One would have to expect that ((1, 0), (1, 0)) could not be sustained in equilibrium for p A > max{p B , p * 2 } and p A close to p * 2 for the same reasons as in the present paper. However, ((1, 0), (1, 0)) would clearly prevail in a neighborhood of (p A , p B ) = (1, 0). As is easy to see from the appertaining laws of motion, p B,t 1−p A,t would remain constant in this neighborhood. One might now expect that if the ratio of initial beliefs p B,0 1−p A,0 was close enough to 1, ((1, 0), (1, 0)) could be sustained along the ray p B,t = (1 − p A,t ) p B,0 1−p A,0 all the way to the hyperplane p A,t = p B,t . Once this hyperplane is reached, admissibility considerations should guarantee the implementability of (( 1 2 , 1 2 ), ( 1 2 , 1 2 )) for all p A,t = p B,t ∈ [p * 2 , 1 2 ]. This would imply that the efficient solution was incentive compatible if, and only if, both hypotheses' being wrong was initially very unlikely. I leave a full exploration of these conjectures for future work.
Furthermore, it could be interesting to explore the additional trade-offs arising when players differed with respect to their innate learning abilities, as parameterized by the Poisson arrival rate of breakthroughs. Analyzing these additional trade-offs that would appear, if, say, player 1 was able to learn faster on risky arm A, while player 2 was faster with risky arm B might yield insights into conditions under which there is excessive, or insufficient, specialization in equilibrium. I intend to explore these questions in future research.
If ((0, 0), (0, 0)) is played, it is easy to see that u 1 (p) = u 2 (p) = s.
If ((1, 0), (1, 0) ) is played, both players' value functions satisfy the following ODE:
which is solved by
where C is some constant of integration. If ((0, 1), (0, 1)) is played, both players' value functions satisfy the following ODE:
If ((0, 1), (1, 0)) is played, player 1's value function is linear:
By the same token, player 2's value is also linear,
Symmetrically, if ((1, 0), (0, 1)) is played we have:
and u 2 (p) = λ + r(1 − p) λ + r g.
If ((0, 0), (1, 0)) is played, player 1's value satisfies the following ODE:
which is solved by Symmetrically, if ((1, 0), (0, 0)) is played, player 1's value satisfies the following ODE:
Meanwhile, player 2's value satisfies:
If ((0, 0), (0, 1)) is played, player 1's value satisfies the following ODE:
which admits of the solution
As for player 2, his value evolves according to:
Symmetrically, if ((0, 1), (0, 0)) is played, player 1's value satisfies the following ODE:
Player 2's value, by contrast, satisfies
Moreover, there are three indifference cases for player i: He might be indifferent between his risky arm A and his safe arm, between his risky arm B and his safe arm, or between his two risky arms of opposite types.
If player i is indifferent between his safe arm and his risky arm A, his value function satisfies the following ODE:
If player i is indifferent between his safe arm and his risky arm B, his value function satisfies the following ODE:
If player i is indifferent between both his risky arms, his value function satisfies the following ODE:
An Auxiliary Result
The logic we discussed in section 5.1 of the main text gives us the following auxiliary result, which will be useful in the proofs of Propositions 4.3, 5.1, and 5.4.
Lemma A.1 Let P ⊂]0, 1[ be an open interval of beliefs in which the action profile remains constant, and let p ∈ P. Let k j (p) = (0, 0). Then the following statements hold:
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (0, 0), then u i (p) = s.
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (1, 0) or k i (p) = (0, 1), then u i (p) ≥ max{s, r+λ 2r+λ g}.
Let k j (p) = (1, 0). Then the following statements hold:
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (0, 0), then λ+r(1−p) λ+r g ≤ u i (p) ≤ 2s − pg.
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (1, 0), then u i (p) ≥ max{ λ+r(1−p) λ+r g, 2s − pg}.
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (0, 1), then u i (p) = λ+r(1−p) λ+r g and p ≤ min{1 − p m , r+λ 2r+3λ }.
Let k j (p) = (0, 1). Then the following statements hold:
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (0, 0), then λ+rp λ+r g ≤ u i (p) ≤ 2s − (1 − p)g.
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (1, 0), then u i (p) = λ+rp λ+r g and p ≥ max{p m , r+2λ 2r+3λ }.
• If player i's best response is given by k i (p) = (0, 1), then u i (p) ≥ max{ λ+rp λ+r g, 2s − (1 − p)g}.
As r+λ 2r+3λ < 1 2 < r+2λ 2r+3λ , the lemma immediately implies that in no equilibrium ((1, 0), (0, 1)) or ((0, 1), (1, 0)) can arise on an open interval. If furthermore g s ≥ 2, and hence 2s − pg ≤ λ+r(1−p) λ+r g for all p ∈ [0, 1], then ((1, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (1, 0)), ((0, 1), (0, 0)) and ((0, 0), (0, 1)) cannot arise on an open interval either.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The policy (k A , k B ) implies a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. The function u satisfies value matching and smooth pasting at p * 1 and 1 − p * 1 , hence is of class C 1 . It is strictly decreasing on ]0, 1 − p * [ and strictly increasing on ]p * , 1[. Moreover, u = s + B B − c B on [0, 1 − p * ], u = s on [1 − p * , p * ], and u = s + B A − c A on [p * , 1] (I drop the arguments for simplicity), which shows that u is indeed the planner's payoff function from (k 1 , k 2 ).
To show that u and this policy (k A , k B ) solve the agent's Bellman equation, and hence that (k 1 , k 2 ) is optimal, it is enough to establish that B Simple algebra shows that if g s ≥ 4(r+λ) 2r+3λ , w(p) := λ+r(1−p) λ+r g ≥ 2s − pg everywhere in [ 1 2 , 1]. Since u( 1 2 ) = w( 1 2 ), and u is strictly increasing while w is strictly decreasing in ] 1 2 , 1[, the claim follows.
Suppose 2(r+λ) r+2λ ≤ g s < 4(r+λ) 2r+3λ , and definew(p) := 2s − pg. It is now straightforward to show thatw( 1 2 ) > w( 1 2 ) = u( 1 2 ), and, therefore, by Lemma A.1, there exists a neighborhood to the right of p = 1 2 in which (1, 0) is not a best response to (1, 0). Suppose that the stakes are very low, i.e. g s < 2(r+λ) r+2λ . From our characterization of the efficient solution (cf. Proposition 3.3), we know that B A (p * 2 , u) = satisfied as p → λ+r(1−p) λ+r g is decreasing and λ+r(1−p * 1 ) λ+r g < s whenever 1 − p * 1 < p m . The interval ]0, 1 −p[ is dealt with in similar fashion.
Proof of Proposition 5.4
The proposed policies imply a well-defined law of motion for the posterior belief. u is strictly decreasing on ]0, 1 2 [ and strictly increasing on ] 1 2 , 1[. Furthermore, as lim , 1], which shows that u is indeed the players' payoff function from ((k A , k B ), (k A , k B )).
To establish existence and uniqueness of p † , note that p → λ+r(1−p) λ+r g and p → 2s − pg are strictly decreasing in p, whereas W is strictly increasing in p on ] 1 2 , 1[. Now, W( 1 2 ) = r+λ λ g − 2r λ s. This is strictly less than λ+ r 2 λ+r g and 2s − g 2 whenever g s < 4(r+λ) 2r+3λ . Moreover, W( 1 2 ) strictly exceeds λ+r(1−p m ) λ+r g = g − r r+λ s and 2s − p m g = s whenever g s > 2r+λ r+λ . Thus, I have established uniqueness and existence of p † and that p † ∈] 1 2 , p m [. By construction, u > max{ λ+r(1−p) λ+r g, 2s − pg} in ]p † , 1], which, by Lemma A.1, implies that ((1, 0), (1, 0)) are mutually best responses in this region; by the same token, u > max{ λ+rp λ+r g, 2s − (1−p)g} in [0, 1−p † [, which, by Lemma A.1, implies that ((0, 1), (0, 1)) are mutually best responses in that region. Now, consider the interval ] 1 2 , p † ]. Here, B A = c A by construction, so all that remains to be shown is B B ≤ c B . By plugging in the indifference condition on u ′ , I get B B = λ r (g − u) + pg − s. This is less than c B = s − (1 − p)g if and only if u ≥ λ+r λ g − 2r λ s = W( 1 2 ) = u( 1 2 ), which is satisfied by the monotonicity properties of u. An analogous argument establishes B A ≤ c A on [1 − p † , 1 2 [.
